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Theoretical Introduction:  
Can Time Be Tricked? – On the Future of Temporal Agency 
 
Felix Ringel 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
This theoretical introduction develops a conceptual argument stemming from the concept of 
‘time-tricking’. Whilst most theories of time in anthropology develop a coherent definition of 
the nature of time, for instance, as ‘cyclical’ or ‘linear’, I here explicate a metaphysical 
distinction in our temporal ontologies, the one between the ontology of the past and the 
ontology of the future. This distinction allows me to do two things: first, I present two 
different versions of time-tricking, one focusing on temporal representations, another 
conceptualising their effects; second, I present the future as the main object of temporal 
agency. By developing the term ‘future-tricking’ I establish a specific kind of temporal 
agency, which is heavily embedded in present politics, interests, and possibilities. I thereby 
contribute to an epistemic approach to the anthropological study of the role time and 
particularly the future play in human lives and practices. 
 
Keywords: epistemology, future, ontology, post-industrial infrastructure, temporal agency, 
time, time-tricking 
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Can Time Be Tricked? – On the Future of Temporal Agency 
 
 
 
The FMS Gera is the last German side trawler. Side trawlers are steam-powered fishing ships, 
which, in contrast to contemporary fishing vessels (so-called stern-trawlers), haul their trawl 
nets inboard over the boat’s right side – portside, that is, in nautical language. She is a proud 
65.55m long, 10.30m wide, and weighs approximately 1473 tons. Initially built in 1959/60 in 
what was then the socialist German Democratic Republic, she was for many years part of the 
East German high-sea fishing fleet, operated by the Rostock Fishing Combine. After the fall 
of the Berlin wall, she became a museum ship in the homeport of former West Germany’s 
fishing industry, the North Sea harbour city of Bremerhaven. The city’s Historical Museum 
uses the Gera as an outpost in the tourist hotspot of the Fishery harbour. She now is a vessel 
for knowledge, depicting the fishermen’s hard working conditions of the times when the city 
and the harbour were busy and bustling. Back then, Bremerhaven was one of the richest cities 
in Germany; today, it is one of the country’s poorest.  
 I am aboard the Gera and the museum’s conservator gives a tour for the few visitors 
who have made their way into the harbour in the usual dump autumn weather. The tour is part 
of the national Open Monuments’ Day, one of the many annual events supporting the touristic 
re-use of this kind of post-industrial infrastructure. The ship was, indeed, a place of industrial 
production. However, the once bright idea of transforming it into a heritage site in order to 
inform visitors about the local past has tarnished; twenty-five years after reunification it turns 
out to be quite a burden. The in any case financially precarious museum suffers from 
declining visitor numbers. This decline is made more severe by the recent opening of various 
popular tourist attractions in Bremerhaven’s newly revamped city centre, including two 
privately run museums, the Climate House and the German Migration Centre. It lacks 
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financial support from the heavily indebted city and struggles even to upkeep the main 
building and its comprehensive historical exhibition. A ship like the Gera, moored in the open 
air, produces a variety of additional problems. 
 The conservator takes us from the prow of the Gera down into the ship’s hull, to the 
bridge, and finally to the very rear. In much detail, she depicts recent conservation projects. 
Step by step, she reveals more obstacles they have been facing over the last years: financial, 
technical, chemical, epistemic ones. Some projects took much longer than expected because 
her team at first had to find the right colour, fit, or tool; others required more funding than 
they had (or would ever have, as she ironically puts it) or a different kind of expertise than 
they could offer. All undertakings had to be tailored to Bremerhaven’s weather conditions and 
the Gera’s actual constitution. At the end of the tour, she summarises her team’s efforts in a 
smiling and (in no way bitter) throwaway remark: once they will have completed their work 
on one end of the ship, they can just about start again at the other. If they can catch up with 
the process of disintegration at all, I hasten to add. 
 This contrasts with the claims of the museum’s website: ‘On this 66-metre long 
outpost of the Historisches Museum Bremerhaven time stood still over 50 years ago. From the 
trawl net on the fishing deck to the saucepans in the galley and the captain’s uniform in his 
cabin – everything is in its right place…’ (http://www.museumsschiff-
gera.de/?page_id=1079&lang=en). This is obviously the conservator’s official time-tricking 
task: to stop time. However, as she aptly put it: time did exactly not stand still – or rather 
certain biological, chemical and physical processes of decay and decomposition did not. The 
ship’s slow and, in the long run, presumably determinate disintegration on a molecular level is 
ceaselessly spurred on by the brackish harbour water, salty air, heavy winds and regular rain 
showers. Conservators will immediately discern the challenges the Gera’s conservation 
entails, and the particular time-tricking they involve.  
 4 
 Here, we encounter an example in which a certain physical form – an otherwise rather 
solid, heavy and robust form at first sight – slowly, but constantly disintegrates. A few meters 
down the road, we find the opposite situation. The former auction hall for the incoming fresh 
catch has also been put to new use. Where once tons of fish were auctioned and sold every 
day, and thousands of workers earned their living, now either unoccupied emptiness reigns, or 
some small-scale new businesses have been – often only temporarily – established. The 
biggest part of the altogether 547.4m long building, rebuilt in 1982, is used for educational 
purposes. Two vocational training centres have opened, instructing future workers for 
Bremerhaven’s currently stumbling offshore wind farm industry. The future electricians are to 
benefit from the city’s enormous re-industrialisation efforts targeting renewable energies. 
 These parts of the auction hall have been renovated with the help of the EU, as the 
many European Social Fund and European Regional Development ‘Investment in the Future’ 
signs indicate. There is fresh paint on the walls; standard dark grey and blue office carpets 
have been laid; new seminar rooms, workshops, toilets and changing rooms have been fitted 
with customary furniture and equipment. Only the kitchen looks old-fashioned. Either it was 
brought here from another project of the same training company, or it was left from the 
previous occupant. Either way, there has been much investment in this building, at least in 
these parts. Nonetheless, every morning and especially Mondays after the weekend closure, 
the two instructors of one of these centres, the Bremerhaven Wind Centre, have a duty first 
thing in the morning: they have to thoroughly air all rooms.  
 As one immediately notices on touring the premises, the walls reek of fish. Obviously, 
the remaining fish processing companies in the harbour also – depending on what they 
produce and the actual wind direction – emit the kinds of fish odours that could cause this 
smell. But this is different. Even after more than a decade of reuse, the former auction hall is 
olfactorily filled with traces of its past usage. These traces, again, are in some way or another 
working on a molecular level, and it is an awkward feeling to know that, when you smell the 
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fish of old, there must be a substantial connection between your nostrils and, for instance, the 
bowels of a freshly gutted herring from the late 1980s. So here, time has not done its work 
properly. The past lingers despite all incitements to move on. Is the instructors’ morning 
airing procedure the same kind of time-tricking as the conservator’s preservation work? And 
what does ‘time’ actually have to do with all this? Or in other words: what is actually tricked 
in these moments? 
 In this short theoretical introduction, I will use these two ethnographic vignettes to 
show the kind of analytical and conceptual work that can be done with the notion of time-
tricking. Time-tricking, I suggest, can help us think about fundamental anthropological 
problems: time, the future and temporal agency. It does so by forcing us to consider what 
people believe they are actually tricking when they trick time. 
 Before getting started, I would like to make an initial remark on time. Most scholars 
would agree that time itself can, on a very basic level, be defined as the succession of ‘before’ 
and ‘after’. This kind of succession cannot be tricked (as far as I know, time travel is still 
confined to fiction). What can be tricked is, first, our perception of time’s succession, and, 
second, the contents of time’s succession. Usually, these contents are defined as events or 
moments, but the procession of time can also be fairly uneventful. In order to claim that the 
contents of time can be tricked, I have to put forward a metaphysical (in philosophical terms: 
ontological) argument. I do so despite my conviction, that recent non-ontological, explicily 
epistemic takes on time (e.g. Bear 2014b; Miyazaki 2004) already offer a solid safe-haven for 
the analysis of the role time plays in human life. In contrast to, in current anthropological 
terms: ontological concerns about the nature of time, I want to draw a metaphysical 
distinction between the past and the future. Building on this commonly implicit ontological 
distinction by my informants, I argue that humans, when attempting to trick the contents of 
time, actually engage in what I want to call future-tricking. And future-tricking, as I hope this 
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special issue demonstrates, is something worthwhile, that we as anthropologists should 
engage in more explicitly (potentially cf. Nielsen 2011 -- less so Nielsen 2014, read again!).   
 
Tricking Knowledge about Time vs. Future-Tricking 
The two introductory vignettes underline that time is a tricky issue. Anthropology – along 
with many other disciplines – has never had an easy relationship to time. Several 
anthropologists have attested to this difficult relationship, notably Nancy Munn (1992), 
Alfred Gell (1992), Matt Hodges (2008) and Laura Bear (2014b). Their overviews of the 
anthropology of time span at least from Durkheim’s conception of time as social time, and all 
of them laudably argue for a more complex and explicit approach to time, whose 
pervasiveness, following Munn (1992: 93), is indeed ‘an inescapable dimension of all aspects 
of social experience and practice’. As she convincingly argues, this dimension needs further 
analytical and theoretical attention. Gell, however, encouragingly underlines that there ‘is no 
need to be in awe of time, which is no more mysterious than any other facet of our experience 
of the world’ (Gell 1992: 314). The idea of time-tricking is to be understood exactly in this 
vein. Whilst this term immediately re-raises the question of temporal agency, which has long 
lacked specific attention, it also prompts at least two further investigations: first, into our own 
thoughts about what time actually is, (cf. Hodges 2008); and, second, as I argue here, into our 
metaphysics of the future.  
 The term time-tricking can be understood in two fundamentally different ways. The 
first one refers to practices that manipulate, coordinate, structure, or reorder knowledge about 
temporal processes. These practices trick with time on an epistemic level. The second one 
actually works on time, with other temporal metaphysics in mind. Whereas the first version 
seems rather obvious, the second deserves further explication. The central question is, again, 
what is actually being tricked when people do not trick knowledge about time, but time itself? 
I will start with unpacking the first notion of time-tricking, tricking with time.  
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 Much has been written about the many different, creative and often very existential 
ways that human beings operate in and with time (e.g. Hoskins 1996; Orlove 2002; Ssorin-
Chaikov 2006; Vigh 2008). They include all kinds of temporal knowledge practices, with 
which I mean references to, or invocations of, the past or the future in the present of 
referencing. However, for anthropologists, references to times past are often not important 
because they address the past, but because they tell us something about the present we 
investigate, and its potential futures. These representations of the past are, in this sense, 
timely, rather then ‘of time’ or ‘of the past’. As contemporary matters, they are defined by 
present-day interests, conflicts and negotiations (e.g. Boyer 2006; Ringel 2013).  
 Consequentially, knowledge of, for instance, the past, is easily tricked: one can 
conceal certain aspects, rewrite history, focus differently, or even trick oneself with more 
favourable accounts and slight adjustments against one’s better knowledge. Whether as actual 
lies or self-assuring deceptions, what is tricked is a social, contextually concrete 
representation of the past, often deeply embedded in long-standing social or political 
conflicts. Anthropologists refer to such practices as temporal politics, describing epistemic 
clashes, such as the ones that the large body of literature on memory tracks (e.g. Antze and 
Lambek 1996; Kaneff 2003). All we are altering here is our present perception of past events, 
not the events themselves: the Gera’s conservator cannot affect how the ship has been built, 
used or preserved over the years of its existence; nor can the instructors undo the use of the 
hall or the gutting of the 1980s herring. However, as I did in the beginning of this 
introduction, I can present a selective account of the past to fit into the genre and format of a 
certain context, here the one of this theoretical introduction.  
 Tricking (scientific as much as non-scientific) knowledge about the past strongly links 
this form of time-tricking to an epistemological approach to time more generally. As Barbara 
Adam (1990: 38) underlines: ‘Any reality that transcends the present must be exhibited in it.’ 
What counts for the past, therefore, also counts for the future, or rather for representations of 
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it. Still, there is more to what Munn, in turn, refers to as a ‘temporalization’, the ‘basic 
sociocultural processes through which temporality is constructed’ (1992: 116), when it comes 
to the future. What I have in mind are the actual effects, and intentions, of temporal 
representations, particularly the ones of the future, which, as Munn also emphasises, have 
long remained analytically neglected.  
 This takes me to the discussion of the second version of time-tricking: future-tricking, 
i.e. a tricking of, not with, time. This approach allows me to answer the question about what is 
being tricked differently in this version. I base this discussion on the rather simple fact that 
many people implicitly assume a different ontological status of the future, when they try to 
affect it. This does not contradict Adam’s epistemological approach, but it adds a 
metaphysical distinction to the debates on what time actually is.  
 The topic of the future offers a new perspective on both time and temporal agency. On 
the level of epistemic representations of the future similar restrictions remain. They are also 
heavily embedded in the present, and can be variedly more u- or dystopian, filled with hope or 
despair, viciously deceptive, naively optimistic, or in some horribly or wonderfully efficient 
way convincing to the extent of becoming prophetically self-fulfilling. Many ethnographic 
examples show that people assume that past events cannot be altered, and that they can only 
change their and others’ perceptions of past events. As I underlined above, the Gera’s curator 
does not attempt to change the way the ship was dealt with in the past, but she wants to secure 
the ship’s future existence as a vessel of knowledge about the past. By maintaining the ship, 
she attempts to change the course and contents of future events, implicitly assuming that 
future events can be altered.  
 By predicting, forecasting, prophesising, conjuring, pro- and evoking, adumbrating, 
dreading, hoping, planning, projecting, envisioning, arranging, intending, designing, 
budgeting, aligning, organising, coordinating, we attempt to subject the future content of the 
progression of time to our agency. Much human practice is directed at making one’s desired 
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outcomes more probable, and like the conservator or the instructors, we might actually 
accelerate, decelerate, interrupt, or delay if not time itself, then particular future contents of 
time or relations between these contents. This is when time-tricking goes beyond matters of 
representation. Any relation to the future is therefore pregnant with potential for actually 
tricking time, whose ‘real’ contents is affected. Importantly, as I argue elsewhere (Ringel 
2014), such practices do not have to result in the emergence of something new; they also 
effect, as the recent special issue on modern time (Bear 2014a) variously emphasized, the 
maintenance and endurance of certain practices, infrastructures and ideas.  
 This second version of time-tricking, then, works through temporal representations, 
with its own ontological foundations and transformative effects. By planning, for instance, we 
attempt to bring the intended future into existence. This can fail: present predictions of the 
future can turn out to be either true or false in the future; they might remain ‘elusive 
promises’ (Abram and Weszkalnys 2013). We still manipulate temporal processes: we can 
actually slow down or speed up our own practices in relation to those of others; we can install 
specific rhythms, structures, and temporal orders that shall coordinate social life in the future. 
Much insight has been gained from such practices and their distinct effects, in the 
anthropology and wider sociology of time (from, e.g., E.P. Thomson 1967 or James and Mills 
2005). But if this is the case, than we again have to clarify how to ground the possibility of 
this kind of temporal agency in the first place. 
 For instance, Captain Cook’s untimely death on Hawaii, subject of the famous 
Sahlins-Obeyesekere debate (Sahlins 1985, 1995; Obeyesekere 1992), is such an effect of the 
manipulation of the contents of time. But whether we conceptualise his death as simply 
stemming from a terrible cultural (in current anthropological terms: ontological) 
misunderstanding of the timing of his return (Sahlins’ position) or rather from concerted and 
conscious time-tricking efforts by confronting local interest groups (Obeyesekere’s 
standpoint), makes all the difference. Whether particular Hawaiians really thought that Cook 
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was their god Lono or whether they used this argument to gain an advantage, entails the 
projection of very different ontologies of time by the analyst. The first one explains the – 
from Cook’s perspective – lethal effects of these representations of time and its necessary 
future(s) as deeply embedded in local ontologies of circular time; the second one works 
without a ontologico-temporal othering and presumes the same understanding of the linearity 
of time at work in local practices. More importantly, these approaches differ in their 
understanding of both: temporal agency and the succession of time. Whereas the first 
explanation sounds deterministic in that one understanding of time (cyclical) had to lead a 
certain outcome (which is still effected by a specific kind of temporal agency), the second 
explanation emphasizes with a different understanding of agency the openness of the content 
of the future: Cook could have also not been killed if other futures had been favoured in the 
Hawaiians’ debates. 
 The Gera’s conservator understanding of her own temporal agency mirrors the latter 
explanation. She also has a clear-cut idea of the future, in this case the ship’s future (in a 
linear conception of time), and she knows that if she was not to intervene, the Gera would be 
more or less disintegrated in, say, at least three decades. By her interventions, however, she 
pushes this otherwise probable future further back in time, filling the contents of the time 
before that with different futures. In her ontology of time, she can bring by a different future 
than expected. She has, in this sense, tricked the future on the basis of giving it a different 
metaphysical quality than the past. 
 However, the idea of future-tricking also points to the limits of temporal agency, 
which oddly enough can be described in epistemic terms. What about future contents that 
become present despite not being previously predicted? Cook’s death, for instance, could also 
be seen to stem from the workings of time itself: the mast of the ship could as well not have 
broken and thereby forced Cook’s fatal return. This obviously does not constitute a mystic 
dimension of time. Rather, it shows the limits of our attempts of temporal representation and 
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the effects we can have on the future. Time is tricky yet again: it seems even as if time can 
trick us back – such as it keeps on tricking the Gera’s conservator, the vocational instructors 
in the former fish auction hall, or Captain Cook back in the 18th century. Temporal processes, 
therefore, continuously produce situations, in which agency is lacking, and in which actual 
temporal agency with regards to actually ‘changing’ the future arguably remains an illusion. 
Still, the presumed ontological openness of the future, which differs in relation to the 
metaphysical quality given to the past, allows and invites agency, and at the same time it 
proofs the ideas we have about its nature in each act we direct towards it, whether the attempt 
of time-tricking is successful or not. That there is temporal ‘succession’ is the basis for this 
kind of tricking; the contents of time is tricked because we know that the current present is 
necessarily to change. 
 The future’s (and thereby also time’s) inherent openness does not always lead to 
sudden surprise, shock, terror, amazement and astonishment. In less dramatic situations, time 
slips out of our hands more subtly. However, particularly the future continuously flees our 
epistemic grip. A moment of crisis, as the world has recently experienced in abundance, can 
often be extended to periods of chronic crises (cf. Vigh 2008), where representations of the 
future can only ever be unconvincing. Often we are made aware, that we cannot the future 
convincingly at all. Jane Guyer (2007) felicitously described this as a form of ‘enforced 
presentism’, which, she argues, is currently paired with a widespread form of ‘fantasy 
futurism’. Both, enforced presentism and fantasy futurism, however, take temporal agency 
away from those they subject to their epistemic logic. When we counter such presumed 
inabilities to get a hold on, and then potentially trick, time, we regain temporal agency by 
applying agency over precisely the future, that we or our informants tentatively trick.  
 The individual contributions to this special issue give plenty of examples in which, 
next to social and material relations as well as rhythms and sequences, yet further temporal 
matters as well as time itself in form of the future are the target of human practices. The 
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authors’ informants thereby predominantly target their current futures: they attempt to alter 
the future so that it does or, indeed, does not become the present (in the future). These 
manifold efforts to manipulate the future open up time as a subject to agency. In the next 
section, I show how this affects our ontologies of time, and our conceptions of temporal 
agency. 
 
Time and Agency 
Recently, there have been widespread concerns about what there really is, in Anthropology. 
This is understandable in many ways, one being that there seems to be a hardly coherent 
abundance in political, ideological and cosmological discourses on the nature of the times we 
are living in. Our current so-called ‘acceleration of time’ seems to speed up our ontological 
imaginaries, and spark new accounts of what there really is (potentially: cf. Dalsgaard and 
Nielsen 2013).  
 Such ontological meanderings are obviously not new to the discipline, and hit it time 
and again. Time as a metaphysical issue is itself an obvious problem for ontological thought. 
With regards to the anthropology of time, we find, for instance, references to what 
contemporary anthropologists would refer to as ontology in and around the 1970s oil crises 
(Geertz 1973; Bloch 1977) and in the emerging post-Cold War world throughout the 1990s 
(cf. Sahlins-Obeyesekere-debate above). Both debates raised the question whether two (in 
anthropological jargon:) ‘ontologically’  exclusive positions exist with regards to how people 
conceptualise time as either existing in a linear or a circular fashion. In both cases, these 
concerns were answered with accounts of how these different representations of time are 
actually not exclusive, and human agency is much more creative and inclusive then the 
anthropologists expected (Howe 1981; Borofsky 1997). Howe’s and Borofsky’s accounts 
respectively seem to infer that the social construction as well as the personal experience of 
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time remain an epistemic issue. And here I want to insert again the metaphysical distinction 
between the past and the future.  
 It was throughout the 1990s that the anthropology of time conceptually proceeded with 
force. Leaving the issue of cultural differences aside, many contributors to this body of 
literature differed in that they explicitly deployed an epistemological approach. Whereas Gell 
(1992) created an account of time as an epistemic, metaphysical and phenomenological issue, 
Munn (1992) and Greenhouse (1996) fused practice theory and phenomenology with 
concerns about culture. This cultural approach stayed with the discipline (recently influential: 
Guyer 2007; Orlove 2002), although it seemed more like a way of sidestepping a proper 
theory of knowledge. Matt Hodges has picked up the issue of ‘temporal ontology’ again in 
2008, and provided the most detailed reflection about the nature of time, proposing a 
Deleuzian ontology of ‘flux’ (versus ‘progress’), a form of constant emergence as a way out, 
again, of different cultural and anthropological ontologies of time. I agree with him that such 
ontologies need to be made explicit. However, temporal ontologies, as I have shown above, 
should also be specified with regards to different ontological characteristics given to different 
temporal dimensions. In most human practices, different logoi of what there really (onticly, so 
to speak) is concerning time, are in place. With the second time-tricking alternative of future-
tricking, we can add to this ontological complexity: tricking the knowledge about time works 
with presupposing that the past has existed, but cannot be tricked; future-tricking, on the other 
hand, presupposes that the future does not yet exist, in order to be able to trick it. With this in 
mind, the answer to the question of what is tricked, is a simple one: all potential future 
presents and their possible ‘actualisations’, to deploy Deleuze’s term via Hodges. This also 
allows a new consideration of temporal agency. 
 Given time’s acclaimed pervasiveness and, subsequently, the ubiquity of human 
temporal agency resulting from it, there are surprisingly few accounts of temporal agency. 
The first prominent one after Obeyesekere and Howe is Carol Greenhouse’s 1996 
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contribution, in which she links time and agency through concerns about power, empire and 
cultural change. However, in her case, innovations and reconfigurations of temporal agency 
remain thoroughly embedded in the concept of culture. As in Guyer’s case (2007), knowledge 
practices are then conditioned by their cultural contexts, and epistemic relations to time 
follow that same somewhat limiting as well as enabling logic.  
 In contrast, both versions of time-tricking from above underline the multiple capacities 
to relate to time in any socio-cultural context. Guyer herself proposed one version of temporal 
agency that mirrors my first version of tricking with time – namely the term ‘temporal 
reasoning’ as the ‘reach of thought and imagination, of planning and hoping, of tracing out 
mutual influences, of engaging in struggles for specific goals, in short, of the process of 
implicating oneself in the ongoing life of the social and material world’ (2007: 408) – which, 
although in different times and spaces with different emphases and configurations, still allows 
for all kinds of temporal agency. I described one example, in which the inhabitants of an 
extreme case of an East German shrinking city managed to collectively carve out new 
epistemic domains that sidestep the dominant once of ‘enforced presentism’ and ‘fantasy 
futurism’, or rather of ‘no futurism’ (Ringel 2012), thereby regaining an epistemic and 
thereby practical hold on their near futures. Culture did not seem necessary to analyse these 
efforts. The same counts for Alfred Gell’s (1992: 235f) take on temporal agency: his idea of 
‘temporal maps’, which sidesteps the notion of culture and rather works between the domains 
of personal experience and metaphysics. Recently, Laura Bear (2014b: 14-16; cf. also Vigh’s 
2008 idea of ‘navigation’) has picked up Gell’s idea of temporal maps, and I agree with her 
critique that we should account for the social manoeuvring on these maps and thereby go 
beyond Gell’s phenomenological emphasis.  
 As we see, there are already a few conceptual propositions, which can help us to 
account for temporal agency. Time-tricking adds to these a clear focus on the future as the 
domain which is most commonly subjected to temporal agency. The underlying logic for this 
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is that, although people often occupy themselves with representations and conflicts about the 
past, the future is given a different metaphysical quality, which allows it to be subjected to 
human agency in the first place. 
 
Conclusion: Time for the Future 
Time-tricking invites us to follow this rugged genealogy of temporal agency, and human 
relations to time. Some of the ways in which it can be productive, I hope to have indicated in 
this brief theoretical introduction. Whilst I leave the reader with the idea of future-tricking in 
an encouraging gesture, I want to stress yet another point made recently by Laura Bear 
(2014b: 6): the knowledge practices, which we are concerned with in this issue, as much as 
the agency that is claim with them on the future, do not happen in thin air. Bear’s emphasis on 
‘the labour in/of time’ (ibid.) for very good reason refers to the political economies and power 
relations in which such temporal practices, indeed, all knowledge practices, necessarily take 
place. Although the term ‘time-tricking’ facilitates metaphysical focus with an initially 
playful point of departure, I do not perceive it as an uncritical, apolitical term. In contrast, the 
ontological assurance, that the future can be tricked, and that the experimentation with 
knowledge might be a good starting point for that, entails an incitement for further future-
tricking. Since both, the training centre and the Historical Museum are threatened by closure 
because of dwindling funding, the conservator’s and the instructors’ continuous attempts of 
time-tricking in order to guarantee the reuse of their post-industrial infrastructure are, 
therefore, embedded in a whole bundle of attempts to trick the future in precarious times.   
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